Defence Cooperation between India and Myanmar: Analysing the Recent Trajectory
Dr. Sampa Kundu
(The author is a New Delhi based geopolitical analyst and researcher. She can
be reached at sampa.sun@gmail.com)
Introduction: In the last week of August, the Indian Army handed
over10 military-spec Tata Safari Storme SUVs to the Myanmar Army. Though only a
limited number of print and digital media covered this news in detail, from the
perspective of bilateral defence cooperation between neighbours this can trigger
a discussion on the growth of the defence partnership between New Delhi and Nay
Pyi Taw. According to a report by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI, 2017), India is one of the top five arms exporters
to Myanmar along with China, Russia, Israel, and Ukraine. The defence cooperation
between India and Myanmar has recently seen a notable improvement as both the countries
signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in the last week of July 2019 to strengthen
military-to-military ties in training, joint surveillance, maritime security, medical
cooperation, infrastructure and environmental factors such as pollution. After the
signing ceremony of the mentioned MoU, the Defence Ministry of India issued a statement
mentioning Myanmar as “…a key pillar of India’s Act East Policy towards
prioritizing relations with its East Asian neighbors”. The statement emphasised
that the defence cooperation between India and Myanmar has seen steady improvements in
the recent years. As The Commander-in-Chief of Myanmar Defence Service Senior General
Min Aung Hlaing came to India to sign the MoU, he met the Chiefs of the Indian Armed
Forces including the Chief of Air Staff Air Chief Marshal BS Dhanoa, Chief of Army
Staff General Bipin Rawat, and Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Karambir Singh. The
recent developments in the India-Myanmar bilateral defence cooperation also included
a $37.9 million contract for the supply of indigenously built torpedoes which India
already delivered to the Myanmar Navy and another contract for transferring a Russian-made
Kilo-class diesel-electric Submarine to enhance the capability of the Myanmar Navy.
This will be Myanmar Navy’s first Submarine. INS Sindhuvir is currently undergoing
modernisation in the port of Vishakhapatnam and is expected to be transferred to
Myanmar shortly. That, Myanmar was seeking to acquire a submarine, in an order to
be in sync with its neighbours in Southeast Asia, was pointed out by the country’s
Deputy Defence Minister Major General Myint Nwe in May 2017. According to some reports and a survey conducted
by the Singaporean Defence Ministry, many Southeast Asian countries have seen an
upsurge in acquiring submarines in recent years. The survey mentioned an increase
in the number of submarines in the region from 200 to 250 by 2025, with Vietnam having the largest number
of Kilo-class submarines. Other countries having submarines in their possessions
include Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Having said that, Myanmar, along with
some other Southeast Asian countries, has the potential to attract Indian defence
suppliers as the country is trying to mark a presence as a prominent defence supplier
in the region and the world at large.
The question is, why Nay Pyi Taw? And, the answer lies in several
facts. First, geographically Myanmar is located between India and China, and, it
is in India’s interest to appease the government of Myanmar if it wants to
mark its footprints in Myanmar, a country which has always experienced Chinese influence-
on its military, politics, economics, and infrastructure. Second, in recent years,
India has started branding itself as an Indo-Pacific power and in this direction,
New Delhi has enhanced its bilateral and multilateral relationships with almost
every country in the region including Southeast Asian countries that geographically
sit at the centre of the Indo-Pacific. From this perspective, upgraded bilateral
defence cooperation with Nay Pyi Taw seems to be a part of the rational foreign
policy aimed at augmenting India’s status as an important Indo-Pacific stakeholder.
This also goes well with India’s desire to look beyond South Asia.Third, from
security and economic perspectives, a good neighbourly relationship with Myanmar
is a necessity for New Delhi. Myanmar is Northeast India’s gateway to Southeast
Asia and East Asia as well. India’s cross-country infrastructure and connectivity
projects like the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway, Kaladan Multimodal
Transit and Transport Project, etc., and the internal security of Northeast India
could face more trouble if India and Myanmar had not taken forward-looking steps
to augment their defence and security ties. These factors explain the initiation
of the Joint Consultative Commission in July 2018 by former Indian External Affairs
Minister Sushma Swaraj and her counterpart from Myanmar, U WunnaMaungLwin in New
Delhi. In this meeting, India spoke about assisting Myanmar in upgrading and modernising
its defence forces. The visible outcomes of such realisation can be seen as New
Delhi and Nay Pyi Taw have started a number of new bilateral defence exercises in
recent times. In November 2017, the first-ever India-Myanmar Bilateral Army Exercise
(IMBAX) took place and, in March 2018 the first India-Myanmar Naval Exercise (IMNEX)
was conducted in the Bay of Bengal.
Why New Delhi?From Myanmar’s perspective too, both countries
need to continue their relationships for multiple reasons. First, Myanmar and its
leaders are continuously facing international criticisms over its targeted violence
against the Rohingya community. In this context, closer friendship with India can
give the leaders in Myanmar a sense of relief. One needs to remember, to give Myanmar
a comforting zone, New Delhi chose not to condemn the atrocities done by the Myanmar
military on the Rohingyas and has never criticised its de facto leader, Daw Aung
San Suu Kyi for her support to the Tatmadaw in this case. One can see a similarity
in Beijing and New Delhi’s approaches towards the Rohingya refugee crisis
in Rakhine state, though both the capitals have different reasons behind that, something
which is beyond the scope of this commentary. Second, despite maintaining a close
neighbourly relationship with China, Nay Pyi Taw is well aware of the fact that
China plays a double game in Myanmar. On the one hand, it reassures Nay Pyi Taw
about its intent of cooperating with Myanmar in curbing cross-border insurgency
and on the other hand, it secretly helps various insurgent groups like the Kokang
Army, the Wa State Army, and the Kachin Independence Army along the borders of China
and Myanmar. This, being the situation at the ground, Myanmar tries to maintain
a balance in its external relations with its neighbours in an order to avoid over-dependence
on Beijing. India epitomizes a practical option for Nay Pyi Taw in this case. Third,
linked to the second point, it is again rational for Nay Pyi Taw to keep its door
open for all of its existing and future sources of foreign investment and development
partners including India, Japan, Singapore, Australia and others in the region for
its own benefits.
Conclusion: India’s enhanced bilateral relationship
with Myanmar is a reflection of today’s realities which are different from
late 1980s when New Delhi decided to support the pro-democratic movements in Burma/Myanmar.
New Delhi soon realised the importance of Myanmar’s geostrategic position
and slowly started making a shift in its approach towards Myanmar. The enhanced
defence cooperation between Nay Pyi Taw and Delhi is a necessity as well as an outcome
of the changing geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific which serves India’s domestic
interests as well as regional aspirations. At the same time, this partnership is
expected to benefit Myanmar as well, as stated above. Hence, one may conclude that
the future of India-Myanmar defence partnership is bright and worth to watch while
the undercurrents of national interests of both the countries are sustained well.
An edited version of this article was published by Visvaneeti, Rethinking India’s
Foreign Policy, a SRCC Economic Society Initiative, October 2019.